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High intelligence prevents the negative impact of
anxiety on working memory
Adam Chuderski
Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
Using a large sample and the confirmatory factor analysis, the study investigated the relationships
between anxiety, working memory (WM) and (fluid) intelligence. The study showed that the negative
impact of anxiety on WM functioning diminishes with increasing intelligence, and that anxiety
can significantly affect WM only in people below average intelligence. This effect could not be fully
explained by the sheer differences in WM capacity (WMC), suggesting the importance of higher-
level cognition in coping with anxiety. Although intelligence moderated the impact of anxiety on
WM, it was only weakly related to anxiety. In contrast to previous studies, anxiety explained the
substantial amount of WMC variance (17.8%) in less intelligent participants, but none of the variance
in more intelligent ones. These results can be explained in terms of either increased motivation of
intelligent but anxious people to cope with a WM task, or their ability to compensate decrements
in WM.
Keywords: Anxiety; Intelligence; Working memory; Confirmatory factor analysis.
Anxiety is defined as the emotion in which feelings
of tension, worried thoughts and avoidance tend-
encies are observed. It is known to negatively affect
a large range of mental processes (Eysenck &
Derakshan, 2011; MacLeod & Donellan, 1993).
One such process is working memory (WM)—the
cognitive mechanism responsible for active main-
tenance and goal-directed manipulation of informa-
tion (Cowan, 2001), whose capacity (WMC) is
measured with a number of items recalled, or the
accuracy of respective mental transformations. The
disruptive effect of anxiety on WM functioning has
considerable consequences for higher-level cogni-
tion, as WM substantially underlies such processes
as language comprehension, reasoning, planning
and problem solving (for a review see Wiley &
Jarosz, 2012), which are crucial for the success in
academic, professional and daily life (Deary, 2012).
A number of studies have demonstrated that
when high anxiety groups are compared to low
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anxiety groups, WM functioning and/or high-
level cognition are decreased in the former. For
example, Ashcraft and Kirk (2001) found lower
WM scores in high math anxiety participants than
in low anxiety people. Most likely, because of this
fact the high anxiety participants also did worse on
math problems. Leon and Revelle (1985) demon-
strated that high anxiety participants perform
worse on geometric analogy problems. A similar
effect was shown in case of verbal analogies (Klein
& Barnes, 1994). Also, more anxious participants
had more problems with valid decision making
(Nichols-Hoppe & Beach, 1990).
It could be supposed that, indeed, it is anxiety
that disrupts operation of WM, however, it is also
possible that ineffective WM does make people
more anxious (e.g., because they often fail to cope
with a task and/or perceive it as more difficult).
Although the latter case cannot be definitely
overruled, several experiments directly manipu-
lated the level of state anxiety (the level of
currently experienced anxiety reported by people)
by using appropriate pressure, stress, threat of
shock or stimuli of negative emotional valence,
and they demonstrated that higher anxiety may
directly deteriorate WM (e.g., Lavric, Rippon, &
Gray, 2003; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000), even within
the same people (e.g., Lavric et al., 2003).
Several theories attempted to explain this
causal link. The most influential explanation
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007)
predicts that anxiety diverts controlled attention
(i.e., the central executive of WM), being a
crucial component of WM, from a task to stimuli
or events unrelated to that task. Because of that
fact, according to Eysenck et al.’s theory, when
attention needs to be involved in a task, more
anxious participants require more effort and/or
cognitive resources to reach the same level of
performance as less anxious participants (i.e., the
former display a decreased efficiency of perform-
ance; for empirical evidence see Eysenck, Payne,
& Derakshan, 2005). More automatic processes
seem to suffer less from anxiety (if at all).
Moreover, during performance on cognitive tasks,
anxious participants show more worried thoughts
(ruminations), increased self-preoccupation, as well
as more concerns about their performance and
its future evaluation (Sarason, 1998; Seibert &
Ellis, 1991), which also may negatively impact
their performance.
With such substantial effects of anxiety on
WM, their strong correlation might be expected.
Surprisingly, in psychometric studies which
accounted for such a correlation in large and full
(i.e., not based on extreme anxiety groups) samples
found either weak or null links between anxiety
and WMC. For example, Salthouse, Berish, and
Siedlecki (2004) found non-significant correla-
tions between neuroticism (a personality trait
strongly associated with anxiety) and both atten-
tion control and storage capacity components of
WM, whereas the link between the former and
reasoning was significant, but very weak (r =
−.13). Similarly, weak (and this time non-signi-
ficant) links between neuroticism and both general
and fluid intelligence (Gf; ability to use reasoning
in order to solve novel abstract problems) were
found by DeYoung, Peterson, and Higgins
(2005). A slightly stronger neuroticism–Gf cor-
relation (r = −.22) was observed by Unsworth et al.
(2009), but they found no link with WM
measures. Finally, the meta-analysis of 156 studies
(Seipp, 1991) estimated the link between anxiety
and academic performance (related to WM and
Gf) also to be weak (r = −.21).
There were fewer studies which correlated WM
and state anxiety. One such study recently sug-
gested an important clue for why the strong
experimental effects of anxiety on cognitive pro-
cessing were not accompanied by strong correla-
tions between both. Owens, Stevenson, Hadwin,
and Norgate (2014) found, in a sample of 96
adolescents, the opposite relationships between
anxiety and scores on Gf tests: while a substantial
negative correlation (r = −.35) was found for low-
WMC children, a positive link (r = .49) pertained
to high-WMC ones (no link was found for the
average-WMC group). So, the impact of anxiety
on test performance may depend on WM
resources available. However, as a relatively small
sample of children was studied by Owens et al., it
is not known if their results generalise onto the
adult population. For example, Johnson and
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Gronlund (2009) found a weaker correlation
between anxiety and the index of dual-task per-
formance in high-WMC participants than in
medium- and low-WMC ones; however, unlike
in Owens et al. (2014), in all three groups this
correlation was negative (higher anxiety deterio-
rated dual-task performance; rs = −.63, −.41, and
−.19, respectively). Moriya and Sigiura (2013)
found a negative impact of anxiety on speeded
target identification in low-WMC participants,
but no relationship—in high-WMC ones.
However, both latter studies used very small adult
samples (N = 50 and N = 40, respectively),
what undermines the reliability of the results
observed.
The goal of this paper is to assess the links
between three theoretical constructs which are
fundamental to psychology: anxiety, intelligence
and WM, by using an especially large sample of
adult people. The main hypothesis predicts that
the strong experimental effects of anxiety on WM
result in relatively strong correlations between
both these constructs, but only in people with
low cognitive capacities. It is predicted that
participants demonstrating high WMC and/or
intelligence, possibly due to more effective reason-
ing and comprehension processes, are able to
attenuate negative effects of anxiety on their WM.
METHOD
Two methodological developments were intro-
duced in order to reliably test the above prediction.
First, unlike most studies (but see Unsworth et al.,
2009), here the examined constructs were assessed
using a particularly large sample as well as
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; see below).
Second, as much as six diverse WM tests were
used in order to tap more broadly the WM
construct (i.e., three WM functions were tested:
storage capacity, binding of information in WM
and control over WM). This allowed for the
examination of whether various WM functions
are influenced by anxiety in the same or differ-
ent way.
Participants
Volunteer participants were recruited via publicly
accessible social networking websites. Each parti-
cipant gave informed consent and was paid the
equivalent of 10 euro in Polish zloty. A total of
525 people participated (317 women). Two other
participants’ data were discarded due to missing
more than one test. The mean age was 23.3 years
(SD = 4.35, range 18–45). All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants
were asked to sit comfortably, with their eyes
located approximately 60 cm from the screen.
Participants were informed that they were free to
leave the lab at any time. They knew the general
aim of the study (“links between cognitive func-
tions”), and were aware that their results would be
kept anonymous.
Materials
Fluid reasoning tests
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven,
Court, & Raven, 1983) and the figural analogy
test (see Chuderski & Necka, 2012) were applied.
Each item of the Raven test includes a three-by-
three matrix of figural patterns which is missing in
the bottom-right pattern, and eight response
options are the patterns which could potentially
match the missing one. The task is to discover the
rules that govern the distribution of patterns and
to apply them to response options in order to
choose the one and only right pattern. The
analogy test includes 36 figural analogies in the
form “A is to B as C is to X”, where A, B and C
are types of relatively simple patterns of figures, A
is related to B according to between two and five
latent rules (e.g., symmetry, rotation, change in
size, colour, thickness, number of objects, etc.),
and X is an empty space. The task is to choose one
figure from a choice of four which relates to figure
C, as B relates to A. The total number of correctly
answered items in 60 and 45 minutes (i.e., almost
no time pressure was applied) were the scores on
the Raven and analogy tests, respectively.
INTELLIGENCE, ANXIETY AND WM
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Anxiety questionnaire
Anxiety was assessed with two administrations of
the Polish adaptation of X-1 part of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) questionnaire
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). X-1
measures state anxiety. It contained 20 questions
about the current emotional state of a questioned
person, like “I am relaxed” or “I am nervous”.
There are four possible answers: “definitely not” (1
point), “rather not” (2), “rather yes” (3) or
“definitely yes” (4), and the total score is the sum
of points for all questions (reversed for positive
states). Internal consistency of .9 or more was
reported for STAI (Muris, Merckelbach, Ollen-
dick, King, & Bogie, 2002).
WM tasks
Each of the 90 trials of each of two array-
comparison tasks (Cowan, 2001) consisted of a
virtual, 4 × 4 array filled with a few (a random
number from four to nine) stimuli, picked up from
either 10 Greek symbols (e.g., α, β, χ, etc.), or
squares in 10 distinctive colours, in letter and
colour variants, respectively. Each stimulus was
approximately 2 × 2 cm in size (the visual angle of
1.9°). The array was presented for a period equal
to the number of items multiplied by 300 ms, and
then followed by a black square mask of the same
size as the array, presented for 1.2 s. In a random
50% of trials, the second array was identical to the
first one, whereas in the remaining trials, both
arrays differed by exactly one item in one position
which was always a new item (not an item from
another position). If the arrays differed, then the
new item was highlighted by a square red border.
If they were identical, a random item was high-
lighted. The task was to press one of two response
keys depending on whether the highlighted item
differed or not in two arrays (in a 4 s limit). The
trials were self-paced. The score on this task was
the estimated sheer capacity of WM (Cowan,
2001) calculated as the difference between the
proportion of correct responses for arrays with one
item changed and incorrect responses for un-
changed arrays, multiplied by the set size.
Two relation monitoring tasks tapped the
capacity to construct and integrate the bindings
among objects maintained in WM (Oberauer,
Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2008). The tasks
consisted of the presentation of a continuous
sequence of symbol patterns (trials). Each trial
(out of 100 trials in each task) included a 3 × 3
array (approximately 6 × 6 cm in size, the visual
angle of 5.7°) of three-symbol strings (each string
approximately 1.5 × 1.2 cm in size, 1.4° × 1.1° of
visual angle), either three letters out of a set of ten
consonants or three-digit numbers, in the letter
and number versions, respectively. Participants
were asked to detect if three strings ending with
the same digit were located in one row or column.
In each task, in half the arrays, there were exactly
three strings fulfilling the rule, and all other
letters/digits in an array could not match the
rule. In the other half of arrays, no pattern
matched that rule. Participants were instructed to
respond only to trials which included the target
relation, and to withhold their responses in all
other (i.e., no-relation) trials. In each trial, 5 s
(plus 0.1 s blink separating the subsequent arrays)
was allowed. From one to four strings (at random)
in each subsequent array was the same as in the
preceding array. The dependent variable was mean
accuracy in the relation trials minus the mean
proportion of incorrect, no-relation trials.
The antisaccade task (Unsworth, Schrock, &
Engle, 2004), meant to tap the attention-control
function of WM, consisted of 40 test trials. Each
test trial consisted of four events. First, a cue
presented for 1.5 s informed that a target would be
presented in the middle of the side opposite to a
flashing square. Next, a fixation point was pre-
sented in the centre of the screen for 1–2 s. Then,
a rapidly flashing black square (3 cm in size, the
visual angle of 2.9°) was shown in the middle of
the left or right side of the screen, about 16 cm
from the fixation point, for 0.15 s. Finally, a small,
dark grey arrow pointing left, down or right was
presented in the location opposite to the square for
only 0.2 s, and was then replaced by a mask. The
visual angle from both the square and the arrow to
the fixation point was approximately 15°. The task
was to direct attention away from the flashing
CHUDERSKI
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square, to detect the direction of the arrow, and to
press the associated key. The trials were self-
paced. The dependent variable was mean accuracy.
The figure-word task measures specifically the
control over interference in WM. The stimuli,
presented at the centre of the computer screen,
consisted of four figures (square, rhombus, circle
and trapezium, all approximately 4 cm in size, the
visual angle of 3.8°), printed in blue, with a black
border. Each congruent stimulus (random 60 trials)
contained a word (also approximately 4 cm × 1 cm
in size, 3.8° × 0.9°), meaning this very figure. For
incongruent stimuli (another 40 trials), a word did
not match a figure. There was a constraint that the
direct repetition of the target stimuli was not
possible. Trials lasted until a response was given,
or for a maximum of 2.2 s. An 800 ms mask
separated the subsequent trials. The instruction
was to avoid reading a word and to press a
response key assigned to a presented figure. The
dependent variable was the difference between
mean accuracy in the incongruent and congruent
trials (see Kane & Engle, 2003). Each WM task
included detailed instructions and several training
trials.
Procedure
The study was administered in two sessions. The
WM session, which consisted of several compu-
terised WM tasks, lasted about three hours. In
another session, which also lasted three hours, the
Raven test and paper-and-pencil analogies were
applied. The order of sessions was random. They
were separated by a one-hour break. The STAI
questionnaire was applied in the middle of each
session. In the WM session, from two to eight
(depending on a sub-sample) other computerised
tasks were applied, which either were tasks not
related to the present study (e.g., response inhibi-
tion, memory updating, selective attention tasks)
or were WM tasks that included manipulations
aimed to experimentally test some other research
hypothesis and were not applied to the whole
sample. In the paper-and-pencil session, some
participants also fulfilled a relation discovery test
as well as an analogical mapping task, both
unrelated to goals of the present study.
The sample size and data analysis
It has been recommended that the size of the
sample in a CFA study should not be less than
200 participants (Kline, 1998). As the comparison
of two groups (low- vs. high-capacity) was aimed,
the optimal size of the sample examined was
doubled (set to about 500 people). The analysis
of Cook’s (1977) distance statistics indicated that
there were no substantial multivariate outliers in
the sample (the maximum distance was d = 0.16).
A total of 21 (0.4%) missing values were sub-
stituted with respective means.
The data were analysed using a number of
CFA models. In a CFA model, by using observed
measures of a given theoretical construct (e.g., six
WM task scores), a latent variable (e.g., WMC) is
calculated that represents variance shared by all
these measures, avoiding task specific variance.
The correlation paths between latent variables,
which were allowed to correlate, can be estimated.
The fit of CFA models was evaluated by three
indices of fit (see Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline,
1998): Bentler’s comparative fit index (CFI should
exceed .90), root mean square error of approxima-
tion (RMSEA should be less than .08) and its
90% confidence interval, and standardised root
mean square residual (SRMR should be less than
.08). For group models, the population gamma
index (γ) was calculated instead of CFI (as CFI
cannot be calculated in such a case). When
comparing alternative models, it was tested
whether a more complex model yielded a signific-
ant increase in χ2 statistic (if it did, then a simpler
model should have been chosen).
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the summary of measures. All
measures had satisfactory reliability and well
approximated the normal distribution.
First, the CFA model, including three corre-
lated factors: anxiety (loaded by scores on both
INTELLIGENCE, ANXIETY AND WM
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STAI questionnaires), WM (six WM tasks) and
Gf (both intelligence tests), was estimated (see
Figure 1). The fit of this model was acceptable,
N = 525, df = 19, χ2 = 108.86, CFI = .940,
RMSEA = .068 [.055–.082], SRMR = .046 (zero-
order correlations underlying this and other mod-
els are shown in Table 2). Two correlations were
significant: between WM and Gf (r = .703), and
WM and anxiety (r = −.255). The former closely
matched the estimate from a meta-analysis of 14
studies done by Kane, Hambrick, and Conway
(2005). The latter was similar to the above
mentioned Unsworth et al.’s (2009) and Seipp’s
(1991) estimates. The correlation between anxiety
and Gf was not significant (r = −.095). Although
strongly correlated, the WM and Gf factors were
clearly separable, as setting their correlation
to unity substantially decreased the model’s fit,
Δχ2(1) = 97.60, p < .001.
Although the correlation between Gf and
anxiety was not significant, it was wondered if
Gf could moderate the WM–anxiety link. Such a
possibility was suggested by the results of linear
regression, which predicted the WM factor
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and reliabilities for measures used in the study
Task M SD Range Skew Kurtosis Reliability
STAI administration 1 34.65 7.62 20–67 1.05 1.69 n/a
STAI administration 2 38.36 8.34 20–67 0.62 0.22 n/a
Raven APM 22.87 6.14 3–36 −0.55 0.25 .87
Figural analogies 23.82 6.08 6−35 −0.45 −0.46 .83
Colour arrays 2.85 1.27 −0.86 to 6.00 −0.34 −0.13 .67
Letter arrays 2.57 1.46 −1.33 to 6.40 −0.11 −0.57 .68
Letter monitoring 0.75 0.18 −0.10 to 1.00 −1.43 2.64 .82
Number monitoring 0.71 0.20 −0.05 to 1.00 −1.00 0.92 .83
Spatial antisaccade 0.60 0.23 0−1.00 −0.53 −0.56 .92
Figure-word 0.97 0.08 0.45–1.15 −3.14 14.68 .93
Note: N = 525. Reliability = Cronbach’s alpha. n/a, not available.
FLUID
INTELLIGENCE
FIGURAL
ANALOGIES
.712
RAVEN APM
.885
ANXIETY
STAI 2
.602
STAI 1
.935
WORKING
MEMORY
LETTER
MONITORING
NUMBER 
MONITORING
.613
–.095
[–.197 to .007] .544
COLOUR
ARRAYS
LETTER
ARRAYS
SPATIAL
SACCADE
FIGURE-
WORD
.563
.651
.655
.344
.703
[.628 – .778]
–.255
[–.368 to –.142]
Figure 1. The conﬁrmatory factor analysis, including three latent variables (ovals) representing variance shared by (a) two
administrations of the anxiety questionnaire, (b) two intelligence tests and (c) six working memory tasks, respectively. Boxes represent
particular tasks. Values between ovals and boxes represent relevant standardised factor loadings (all ps < .001). Values between ovals
represent relevant path coefﬁcients among latent variables for the whole sample. The dashed line indicates the insigniﬁcant correlation. Data
in brackets represent 95% conﬁdence intervals for correlation coefﬁcients. For the description of tests refer to the text.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix for measures used in confirmatory factor analyses, calculated separately for the full sample (N = 525), the sub-sample scoring below median
in intelligence factor (N = 263) and the sub-sample scoring above median (N = 262)
Full sample Below-median sub-sample Above-median sub-sample
Task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. STAI
administration 1
– – –
2. STAI
administration 2
.56 – .62 – .50 –
3. Raven APM −.08 .00 – −.11 −.13 – −.03 .03 –
4. Figural analogies −.09 .03 .63 – −.17 −.07 .23 – −.01 .04 .16 –
5. Colour arrays −.12 −.06 .42 .34 – −.19 −.16 .33 .21 – −.01 .01 .25 .06 –
6. Letter arrays −.05 .03 .35 .28 .44 – −.06 −.05 .27 .18 .45 – −.02 .10 .22 .07 .31 –
7. Letter monitoring −.17 −.12 .37 .31 .33 .33 – −.26 −.26 .28 .18 .34 .29 – −.02 .03 .24 .12 .16 .26
8. Number
monitoring
−.17 −.17 .32 .20 .35 .20 .50 – −.23 −.21 .24 .01 .32 .14 .50 – −.09 −.16 .19 .07 .26 .16 .41
9. Spatial
antisaccade
−.19 −.11 .39 .35 .44 .40 .36 .34 – −.31 −.23 .33 .29 .42 .41 .35 .29 – −.03 .00 .27 .18 .34 .28 .25 .31
10. Figure-word −.18 −.07 .25 .22 .19 .22 .21 .10 .25 −.15 −.11 .27 .17 .18 .20 .22 .06 .27 −.07 −.03 −.01 .15 .08 .15 .09 .08 .13
Note: All ps < .05, except for correlations presented in italic.
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(Eigenvalue = 2.60) with the anxiety factor and the
product of the anxiety and Gf factors (mean
z scores). Both predictors were significant (ps <
.002). The former yielded β =−.136, and the latter
yielded β = .189, F(2, 521) = 17.02, p < .001,
R2 = .061.
The first group CFA model allowed for a
deeper look into this interaction. In the model,
there were only two factors (anxiety and WM),
whereas the value of the Gf factor was used to
identify two equipotent (the low-Gf and high-Gf)
groups, based on the median split of Gf. The
model estimated the correlation coefficient
between both factors separately for both groups.
However, the model assumed, in both groups, the
equal loadings of each factor on respective mani-
fest measures (i.e., scores in WM tasks/STAI), as
there was no reason to expect that particular tasks
reflected the underlying constructs differently
between groups. The fit of the model presented
in Figure 2 (top panel) was acceptable, N = 525,
df = 46, χ2 = 117.58, γ = .951, RMSEA = .077
[.060 – 095], SRMR = .073. Importantly, the
WM–anxiety correlation in the low-Gf group
(r = −.422) was significantly stronger than in the
high-Gf group (r = −.070, n.s.), t(524) = 4.40,
p < .001. The significance of the difference was
also shown by a deteriorated fit of the model in
which these correlation coefficients were forced
equal, Δχ2(1) = 9.08, p = .003.
It was also tested whether using the median split
in WMC may lead to a similar difference in WM–
anxiety correlation or in Gf–anxiety correlation.
Regarding the former link, due to restricted range,
it is not recommended to use the same variables as
both predictors and group division criterion. Thus,
two measures were picked up as such a criterion
(the colour two-array task and the letter relation
monitoring tasks), whereas the four remaining
WM measures loaded the WM factor. Still, the
ANXIETY
STAI 2
.671
STAI 1
.831 WORKING
MEMORY
LETTER
MONITORING
NUMBER 
MONITORING
.573
.529
COLOUR
ARRAYS
LETTER
ARRAYS
SPATIAL
SACCADE
FIGURE-
WORD
.501
.572
.624
.269
–.422
[–.573 to –.271]
–.071
[–.236 to .094]
ANXIETY
STAI 2
.876
STAI 1
.638 FLUID
INTELLIGENCE
RAVEN APM
FIGURAL
ANALOGIES
.618
.953
–.127
[–.277 to .023]
.204
[.044 – .364]
Figure 2. Top panel: The group conﬁrmatory factor analysis, including two latent variables (ovals) representing anxiety and working
memory. Values between ovals placed above/below the line represent relevant path coefﬁcients between latent variables for the sub-samples
who scored below/above median in the intelligence factor. Bottom panel: An analogous analysis including latent variables representing
anxiety and intelligence. Values between ovals placed above/below the line represent data for the sub-samples who scored below/above median
in the working memory factor. Data in brackets represent 95% conﬁdence intervals for correlation coefﬁcients. For the description of tests refer
to the text.
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indicators of each WM facet (i.e., storage, binding
and control) contributed to this factor. Although
this second group model fit well, N = 525, df = 22,
χ2 = 38.85, γ = .976, RMSEA = .054 [.024 – 082],
SRMR = .067, no significant difference in WM–
anxiety link was found between the groups
(rlow-WMC = −.235 vs. rhigh-WMC = −.297). This
was demonstrated by the insignificant change of fit
when both paths were forced equal, Δχ2(1) = 0.36,
p = .548.
An interesting result (see Figure 2, bottom
panel) was found when by using the third group
CFA model both groups were tested for the
difference in anxiety–intelligence path, N = 525,
df = 6, χ2 = 13.02, γ = .980, RMSEA = .005 [.007
– .116], SRMR = .056. The results (rlow-WMC =
−.127 vs. rhigh-WMC = .204), t(524) = 4.24,
p < .001, indicated that though there was no
significant link between anxiety and Gf in low-
WMC participants, in high-WMC people
increased anxiety was significantly associated with
(slightly) increased intelligence. Forcing both
paths equal significantly decreased the fit of the
model, Δχ2(1) = 7.98, p = .005.
Finally, because six WM measures were avail-
able, it could also be checked whether, in the low-
Gf group, the various facets of WM yield the same
or different correlations with anxiety (the high-Gf
group was not further tested as it did not yield a
significant link between anxiety and WM). Three
factors were formed reflecting the three functions
of WM: storage capacity (the array-comparison
tasks), binding in WM (the relation monitoring
tasks) and control over WM (the antisaccade
and figure-word tasks). The CFA model (see
Figure 3), which fit very well, N = 263, df = 14,
χ2 = 18.97, CFI = .989, RMSEA = .037
[.000–.075], SRMR = .033, yielded strong corre-
lations between WM factors. Moreover, each
factor correlated with anxiety, but the correlation
of the storage capacity factor was significantly
weaker (r = −.226) than of the two remaining
factors, t(262) = 2.25, p = .012, t(262) = 2.25,
p = .001, for the binding (r = −.408) and control
(r = −.468), respectively. Not surprisingly then,
the model in which all three correlation coeffi-
cients were forced equal yielded poorer fit, Δχ2(2)
= 7.78, p = .020.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The study yielded the novel result showing that
the impact of anxiety on WM diminishes with
increasing fluid intelligence (see the results of
linear regression), and that anxiety significantly
affects WM only in people below median intelli-
gence (see the results of CFA modelling). Unlike
ANXIETY
STAI 2
.719
STAI 1
.865
STORAGE
CAPACITY
LETTER
ARRAYS
.645
COLOUR 
ARRAYS .698
BINDING 
IN WM
LETTER
MONITORING
NUMBER 
MONITORING
EXECUTIVE
CONTROL
SPATIAL
SACCADES
FIGURE-
WORD
.801
.624
.752
.356
–.226
[–.393 to –.059]
–.468
[–.644 to –.296]
–.408
[–.584 to –.222]
.825
[.625 – 1.025]
.585
[.430 – .740]
.602
[.416 – .788]
Figure 3. The conﬁrmatory factor analysis for the sub-sample who scored below median in the intelligence factor, including four latent
variables (ovals) representing variance shared by (a) two administrations of the anxiety questionnaire, (b) two storage capacity tasks, (c) two
relation monitoring tasks and (d) two executive control tasks, respectively. Values between ovals represent relevant path coefﬁcients among
latent variables. Data in brackets represent 95% conﬁdence intervals for correlation coefﬁcients. For the description of tests refer to the text.
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in previous studies, the substantial amount of
variance in WMC (17.8%) could be explained by
anxiety in the low-Gf group. In contrast, above-
median intelligence successfully prevented the
negative impact of anxiety on WM. Moreover,
the study replicated and extended Owens et al.’s
(2014) findings, showing that in high-WMC
participants anxiety may be positively related to
intelligence. However, when the large, adult
sample was examined, the moderating effect of
WM on the anxiety–Gf link appeared to be much
weaker than that observed by Owens et al. Finally,
low vs. high levels of WMC did not affect the
WM–anxiety link.
The above results suggest that sheer cognitive
resources likeWMC, even if they are substantial, do
not suffice to attenuate the negative effects of
anxiety (although they may help in coping with it).
More may be needed to prevent such effects, and
the present study predicts that this “more” consists
of effective high-level processes, like reasoning,
comprehension and problem solving, which are
typically associated with fluid intelligence.
Although no correlational study can explain why
intelligence moderates the WM–anxiety link, at
least two plausible explanations may be considered.
First, more intelligent people may be able to
better recognise the fact that anxiety deteriorates
their WM performance, and, for such people,
increased anxiety may be associated with increased
motivation to perform well on tasks. This possib-
ility is supported by observations that in some
conditions, increased motivation allowed anxious
participants to catch up with the scores of emo-
tionally stable people (e.g., in order to avoid
negative evaluation), but, did so at the cost of
lower efficiency of processing (e.g., more time was
needed to get a comparable score; see Eysenck &
Derakshan, 2011). Anxious but intelligent parti-
cipants could focus their attention on a WM task
more, or implement a more careful response
strategy, and, due to such an increased effort,
might improve their results. In contrast, anxious
but less intelligent participants might not recog-
nise that their WM was distorted by anxiety and,
because of that fact, these people put no additional
effort into that task.
Following the suggestion of a reviewer, in order
to test the above hypothesis, reaction times (RTs)
in five WM tasks were analysed (in the anti-
saccade task the real indicator of the processing
speed is the eye-movement latency, which was not
recorded in the present study). These RTs loaded
on two separate factors: one for tasks with time
pressure (the Stroop and two relation monitoring
tasks), and the other for tasks with no pressure
(two array-comparison tasks). The former factor
seems to reflect primarily the processing speed,
whereas the latter one may indicate participants’
speed-accuracy trade-off strategies. Both factors
correlated only weakly (r = .181), but significantly
(95% CI = [.093–.269]). Most importantly, both
the speeded RT factor (r = .098, 95% CI =
[.008–.188]), and the unspeeded factor (r = .126,
95% CI = [.0460–.206]) positively correlated with
anxiety. This means that it took more anxious
participants more time to respond, in comparison
to less anxious people. The fit of the model was
relatively poor, but still acceptable, N = 525, df =
11, χ2 = 70.46, CFI = .935, RMSEA = .098
[.076–.121], SRMR = .062. Adding intelligence
level as a group factor, and correlating RTs and
anxiety separately for high and low ability people,
did not significantly increase the model’s fit,
Δχ2(2) = 2.94, p = .767, and both groups yielded
the similar RT–anxiety correlations. Those results
seem to support the above explanation provided by
attention control theory. However, a relative
weakness of correlations observed leaves room for
other alternative explanations.
For example, perhaps WM resources of both
less and more intelligent people get reduced due to
anxiety in a similar way, but the latter are able to
somehow overcome such decrements, for instance
by switching to cognitive strategies that less
consume WMC, or by using other cognitive
processes which normally would not be recruited
for performance in a WM task (e.g., imagination,
rapid learning, discovery of hidden rules in the
task, etc.). So, although the negative effects of
anxiety would be comparable for people with
different intelligence levels, highly intelligent peo-
ple would cope better with these effects, compens-
ating for WM decrements with other mental
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faculties. As intelligence is known to rely not only
on WM, but also on attention (Schweizer, 2010),
learning (Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Brown, &
Mackintosh, 2009) and long-term memory (Uns-
worth, Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel, 2014), which
might be less prone to or even sometimes benefit
from anxiety (like selective attention; see Math-
ews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997), intelligent
people may be able to use these processes in
fulfilling a WM task. This possibility would also
be consistent with Spearman’s (1927) more gen-
eral “Law of Diminishing Returns”, which pre-
dicts that due to a larger heterogeneity of cognitive
abilities in more intelligent people, various factors
correlate less with Gf in such people than in less
intelligent people, who rely on more homogenous
cognitive mechanisms.
Moreover, the positive relationship between
anxiety and intelligence observed in high-WMC
participants suggests that not only cognitive pro-
cesses can overcome the effects of negative emo-
tions, but also such emotions may be a beneficiary
factor for thinking and reasoning, given that one
possesses sufficient cognitive resources to cope
with a task even under increased anxiety. This
speculation is consistent with data indicating that
negative mood, comparing to positive mood, is
associated with more systematic and analytic
cognitive processing (Pham, 2007), which was
shown to be crucial for high performance on
intelligence tests (Carpenter, Just, & Shell,
1990). Anxious and intelligent people may also
strategically control their processing to a larger
extent (because they are more worried about
errors) than emotionally stable participants, and
cognitive control over reasoning strategies is also
known to positively influence reasoning effective-
ness (Carpenter et al., 1990).
Regarding various functions of WM, the pres-
ent study showed that control in WM is affected
by anxiety to a larger extent than sheer storage
capacity. This result is consistent with several
theories of cognitive consequences of anxiety,
which suggested that anxiety impacts primarily
the executive and attentional functions of WM
(Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Eysenck et al.,
2007; Mathews et al., 1997; Tohill & Holyoak,
2000). However, storage functions of WM are
also believed to rely to some extent on attention
(Cowan, 2001), so the observed (weak) link
between storage and anxiety is unsurprising. A
relatively novel measure of WM functioning, the
relation monitoring tasks, brought results similar
to executive control tasks, suggesting that some
form of attention may be needed also to form
bindings in WM. Although relational monitoring
tasks might be objected as a valid measure of
WMC (as they do not require to memorise any
objects), recent findings have shown that they
share a vast amount of variance with other, better
established WM tasks (e.g., Chuderski, 2014;
Wilhelm, Hildebrandt, & Oberauer, 2013); thus,
the former tasks also properly capture WMC.
To conclude, new knowledge has been gained on
the relationships between emotions (anxiety) and
cognition (WM and intelligence). The study shows
that intelligence, known to determine human suc-
cess in multiple cognitive activities (Deary, 2012), is
also important for at least one emotional aspect of
the mind, that is, for how anxiety interacts with
elementary cognitive processes that underlie various
WM functions. However, the pattern of results
suggests that the interactions between emotions and
cognition may be complex and bidirectional, as it is
possible that in some participants (those with
enough cognitive resources) anxiety may be benefi-
ciary for reasoning.
Finally, the study, showing how disruptive anxi-
ety can be in people with intellectual deficits, also has
fundamental consequences for applied psychology. It
suggests that special care should be taken of condi-
tions in which less intelligent people study or work
(and are tested for results), because any potential
sources of anxiety (e.g., time pressure, negative
feedback, stereotype threat, extreme difficulty, etc.)
yield especially disruptive effects in the cases of such
people (in comparison to high ability people), and
thus, may have severe social consequences (like
underperformance or learned helplessness).
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